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Abstract: Identifying new viral threats, and developing long term defences against current and future computer viruses,
requires an understanding of their behaviour, structure and capabilities. This paper aims to advance this under-
standing by further developing the abstract theory of computer viruses. A method of providing abstract defi-
nitions for classes of viruses is presented in this paper, which addresses inadequacies of previous techniques.
Formal definitions for some classes of viruses are then provided, which correspond to existing informal def-
initions. To relate the abstract theory to the real world, the connection between the abstract definitions and
concrete virus implementations is examined. The use of the proposed method in studying the fundamental
properties of computer viruses is discussed.
1 INTRODUCTION
Current antiviral detection methods and techniques
are largely reactive, with antivirus software being up-
dated according to new viruses and threats that are
discovered(Filiol, 2005)(Dechaux and Filiol, 2016).
There is an “arms race” between computer virus and
antivirus writers(Kramer and Bradfield, 2010), and
any antiviral techniques developed for current com-
puter virus, are ultimately bypassed by new, and more
advanced viral behaviours. A more proactive ap-
proach would be to detect new threats before they
emerge in the real world, for which a thorough un-
derstanding of the possible behaviours, structures and
capabilities of computer viruses is required. It is the
aim of the abstract theory of computer viruses to view
the underlying mechanisms and principles of com-
puter viruses independently of implementation com-
plexities, and to provide some more general results
about computer viruses. And it is the aim of this pa-
per to further this abstract understanding of computer
viruses.
Malware is a more general concept than viruses,
and computer viruses are commonly understood as
malware which has some kind of self-replicating
or self-propagating mechanism(Filiol, 2005)(Cohen,
1986). Nevertheless computer viruses remain highly
relevant to the modern context, with network propa-
gating trojans(worms), and botnets relating to viruses.
a https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9744-6169
Computer virus models can be extended to capture
malware in general by allowing for non-replicating
programs(Adleman, 1990), however this paper is con-
cerned with the self-replicating case. The main con-
tributions of this paper are as follows.
• A formal method for specifying computer viruses
which has its roots in computability theory is pro-
posed. The possible specifications are broader in
scope and are more expressive than those possible
using previous methods.
• A technique for the construction of virus im-
plementations from the formal descriptions is
demonstrated.
Section 2 of the paper reviews how recursion the-
ory(also known as computability theory) relates to
self-replicating programs and computer viruses. Sec-
tion 3.2 presents a formal framework and methodol-
ogy for specifying computer viruses. It is the result
of addressing some previously unnoted inadequacies
of related work, which are discussed in section 3.1.
Section 4 goes on to use this framework to provide
formal counterparts to a number of informal classi-
fications of computer viruses. In particular, classes
which could not be formally specified using previous
methods are presented. Section 4.2 demonstrates how
the framework in this paper can be used to study fun-
damental aspects of structure and behaviour of com-
puter viruses. More complicated viruses require more
complicated theorems from the recursion theory, and
these theorems are discussed in section 5. In section
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5.1, the implementation of a virus from a relatively
complicated abstract definition is constructed, thereby
illuminating the connection between the abstract the-
ory and the real world. Section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2 COMPUTER VIRUSES IN
RECURSION THEORY
This paper will describe computer viruses in func-
tional terms using standard mathematical notation. In
the real world, like any program, computer viruses
appear as some sequence of instructions. Partial re-
cursive functions are those functions which can be
computed by some sequence of instructions1(Rogers,
1987), and the theory of recursive functions allows
for some manipulation of these sequences. Of par-
ticular interest in this paper, is how Kleene’s second
recursion theorem can be used to produce viruses.
This approach has been used before(Zuo and Zhou,
2004)(Bonfante et al., 2006), however while construc-
tive proofs for the existence of certain viruses have
been produced, generation of concrete programs from
these proofs is not straightforward(Bilar and Filiol,
2009). To partially bridge the gap between this ab-
stract approach and the realities of implementation,
this section provides an intuitive explanation of the
proof of Kleene’s second recursion theorem, and out-
lines how programs can be produced from this con-
struction. A more thorough treatment of generation
of viruses is given in section 5 for a more complicated
recursion theorem.
In formal models of computer viruses thus far, a
defining feature of a computer virus is the ability for
self-replication(Cohen, 1986)(Adleman, 1990). As a
trivial example of a program with a self-replicating el-
ement consider a program which outputs its own se-
quence of instructions2. To construct it, the partial
recursive function f which takes two arguments and
outputs its first argument(i.e. f (x,y) = x) can be used.
In pseudocode the instructions for f could be:
f(x, y)
1: Begin
2: return x
3: End
Any input can be given as x, including the sequence
of instructions for f .
Consider now a function which is the same as f ,
1More correctly: any function that can be computed
using some system of Turing complete data-manipulation
rules.
2This kind of program is known as a “quine”.
except that it has its own sequence of instructions
“hardcoded” into its sequence of instructions so that
it only takes the one argument y. Let e denote the se-
quence of instructions for this function, and let ϕe de-
note the function computed by e. The naive approach
of “hardcoding“ is quite troublesome(Bilar and Filiol,
2009).
This approach has the structure:
ϕe(y)
1: Begin
2: x ← sequence of instructions e
3: return x
4: End
Which expands infinitely into
ϕe(y)
1: Begin
2: x ← ‘‘Begin; x ←
‘‘Begin; x ←
‘‘Begin; x ←
...’’
3: return x
4: End
The solution instead lies in including an algorithm
within the instructions which performs the hardcod-
ing itself.
This approach has the structure:
ϕe(y)
1: Begin
2: x ← (sequence of instructions e
with line 2 omitted)
3: out ← (everything up to line 2)
4: out ← out + ‘‘x ← ’’
5: out ← out + x
6: out ← out + (rest of the instructions
starting at line 3)
7: return out
8: End
This solution for the construction of e explains the
essence of Kleene’s recursion theorem, when it is ob-
served that the outputs f (e,y) and ϕe(y) are the same
thing: the sequence of instructions e. Whereas a spe-
cific f was given above, Kleene’s theorem captures
the general case.
THEOREM 1 (Kleene’s 2nd Recursion Theorem).
If f is a partial recursive function, then there is a se-
quence of instructions e such that
ϕe(x) = f (e,x).
Kleene’s theorem states that an e can be found for any
f . The method for constructing e will be similar to the
method shown above for the specific instance of f . It
consists of finding the sequence of instructions for a
function similar to f except that it has a hardcoded
value instead of its first argument(hence the func-
tion takes one fewer arguments), where the hardcoded
value is that same sequence of instructions. An algo-
rithmic solution is required, whereby the hardcoding
process is included in the sequence of instructions(as
shown above). A graphical interpretation of the con-
struction for the proof of Kleene’s recursion theo-
rem appears in Figure 1, where the informal notation
code( f ) is used to denote the sequence of instructions
for f , so that for all x and y, ϕcode( f )(x,y) = f (x,y).
e :
≈
hardcoded
naive
expansion f( , x)
code(f( , x))
code(f(code(f(code(f(.....))))))
f( , x)f(e, x) :
Figure 1: Depiction of the construction for Theorem 1.
To see how this relates to computer viruses, define
a rudimentary computer system environment as a tu-
ple consisting of some number of data files and some
number of program files: (d1, ...,dn, p1, ..., pm). Then
define a program within a system environment as a
sequence of instructions which compute a function
which takes that system environment, and outputs that
same environment with some possible modifications.
An example of a file overwriting virus, would be a se-
quence of instructions which compute a function that
takes a system environment, and returns that system
environment with all the program files replaced with
the virus3. Kleene’s theorem constructs this virus as
follows: take the function f defined as
f (x,d1, ...,dn, p1, ..., pm) = (d1, ...,dn,x, ...,x).
Apply the theorem to obtain the virus e, since e as
defined in the theorem satisfies:
ϕe(d1, ...,dn, p1, ..., pm) = (d1, ...,dn,e, ...,e).
The theorem can prove the existence of viruses for
any Turing complete system, and does not assume the
existence of an operating system, or the ability to read
or write files. In practice, applying the theorem to real
computer programs is simpler, since a program may
simply read its own sequence of instructions from file
3In this case the infected form is exactly the viral se-
quence of instructions. The host program is completely
overwritten.
instead of “hardcoding” them. However Theorem 1
guarantees that this mechanism is not absolutely nec-
essary.
3 ABSTRACT DESCRIPTION OF
COMPUTER VIRUSES
This section presents a novel way of describing the
behaviour of various viruses in terms of partial re-
cursive functions, such that real computer viruses can
be constructed from these descriptions with Theorem
1(as discussed in the previous section). The abstrac-
tion in this approach allows for the study of defining
traits which classify types of viruses independently of
their implementation.
3.1 Related Work
The abstract theory of computer viruses was estab-
lished by Cohen in (Cohen, 1986) and Adleman in
(Adleman, 1990). Cohen used a Turing Machine for-
malism, and loosely4 defined a “virus” as a sequence
of symbols which when interpreted in a given envi-
ronment causes another sequence of symbols to be
modified to contain a (possibly evolved) form of the
virus. This definition is very general and implicitly
captures viruses for any mode of infection. Follow-
ing Cohen’s work and with reference to specific vi-
ral behaviours, Adleman used partial recursive func-
tions to provide a definition for computer viruses.
That method was in turn extended by Zuo and Zhuo
in (Zuo and Zhou, 2004), where more specific ob-
jects describing aspects of computer viruses were in-
troduced, which allowed for the formal definition of
some classes of viruses. Adleman and Zuo and Zhuo
viewed viruses as mappings from programs into “in-
fected programs”, and did not consider viruses inde-
pendently of a host program. Viral programs appear
independently of a host in another recursion theoretic
approach in (Bonfante et al., 2006), in which an al-
ternative to Adleman’s definition is provided as it was
found to be too restrictive.
There is a concept in (Bonfante et al., 2006) that
is thought of as an infected form, called the “propa-
gation vector”, denoted B(v, p). Viruses are defined
with respect to a propagation vector, which describes
how a virus infects a program. However while B(v, p)
is viewed as the “infected form” of the program p
by the virus v within the formalism, it is argued in
4Cohen also provides a formal definition, which is con-
siderably more involved than its “loose” counterpart. How-
ever the same essential idea is captured.
this paper that it does not adequately correspond
to the informal notion and practical reality of an
“infected form”. To demonstrate this, the definition
for virus in (Bonfante et al., 2006) is here reproduced:
DEFINITION 1 (Virus w.r.t Propagation Vector).
Assume that B is a partial recursive function. A virus
w.r.t. to B is a program v such that for any tuple of
programs p, x1, ..., xn,
ϕv(p,x1, ...,xn) = ϕB(v,p)(x1, ...,xn).
If B(v,p) were the infected form, this definition
would essentially describe that the virus and the in-
fected form behave in the same way given the same
input5 (x1, ...,xn). However this should not be the
case for infected forms. Consider a virus v which ap-
pends its instructions to the end of another program,
and let iˆ(p) denote the infected form of a program
p. Now consider that within the system environment
(p1, p2, ..., pn), the program p1 deletes all files in the
system environment, i.e.
ϕp1(p2, ..., pn) = (),
where () is an empty tuple. Then when the instruc-
tions of the infected form iˆ(p1) are carried out, first
all of the files in the system are removed after which
the virus cannot infect any files, i.e.
ϕiˆ(p1)(p2, ..., pn) = ().
If the virus v is defined so that it infects all programs,
i.e.
ϕv(p1, p2, ..., pn) = (iˆ(p1), iˆ(p2), ...iˆ(pn)),
then it is the case that
ϕv(p1, p2, ..., pn) 6= ϕiˆ(p1)(p2, ..., pn).
Hence B(v,p) cannot correspond to iˆ(p), the infected
form of p by v. Thus the definition in (Bonfante et al.,
2006) describes the viral program, but not the infected
form of a program. More recent research has also
viewed the infected form of a program by a virus as
equivalent to the virus(see (Filiol, 2007) as an exam-
ple). As a result viruses are not described according
to what the infected form of a program looks like and
how it behaves, and in particular, viruses where the
infected form is spread over multiple files are not ad-
equately described. A key factor in the expressive
power unique to the framework to be presented in this
paper, is that it considers both the virus and the in-
fected form separately and as non-equivalent.
5More correctly: that a virus given a system environ-
ment outputs the same system environment, as an infected
form within that environment, with the rest of the system
environment as its input.
3.2 Proposed Alternative
Concepts discussed so far are now made more precise.
The set of all words over some fixed alphabet is de-
noted as D , and it is assumed that since any sequence
of instructions can be viewed as some sequence of
symbols, it will be an element of D . Data are also
taken as sequences of symbols and as elements of D .
The symbol ϕ can be thought of as the object which
carries out instructions, and if x ∈D , then ϕx will de-
note the partial recursive function from D to D com-
puted by assuming x is a sequence of instructions and
following them. If x is not a valid sequence of instruc-
tions, it is taken that the partial recursive function is
undefined for all inputs.
It is assumed that there exists a bijective (total) re-
cursive function6 〈 , 〉 which takes two elements of
D and produces a single element ofD . Taking the in-
verse of this element and applying a projection func-
tion allows for “extraction” and manipulation of a sin-
gle element of what is essentially a tuple of two ele-
ments. Similarly, the expression 〈x1,x2...,xn〉 denotes
a bijective recursive function from Dn to D , and can
be thought of as an “encoding” of a tuple of elements
into a single element in such a way that each element
of this encoded tuple can be individually manipulated.
For any function f :D →D , the expression f (x,y,z)
is taken always to mean f (〈x,y,z〉). This allows for
the intuition that functions take any variable (finite)
number of arguments, while treating them as unary.
Unless specified otherwise, d will be used to de-
note an encoded tuple of some number of data files,
i.e. d = 〈d1, ...,dn〉 where for each 1≤ j ≤ n,d j ∈D ,
and is an invalid sequence of instructions according to
ϕ. Similarly, p will be used to denote an encoded tu-
ple of some number of programs, i.e. p= 〈p1, ..., pm〉.
The 〈 , 〉 notation can be applied to d and p, so that
〈d, p〉= 〈d1, ...,dn, p1, ..., pm〉.
For any f :D→D , the symbolic expression
[p r←− f (p j)] is used to denote the encoded value of
the tuple represented by p, but where the element p j
in the tuple represented by p is replaced with f (p j).
For example, if p = 〈p1, p2, ..., pm〉, then
[p r←− f (p1)] = 〈 f (p1), p2, ..., pm〉.
The expression [p r←− f (x, p1, p2)] is the encoding of
the tuple represented by p where the elements p1, and
p2 are replaced by f (x, p1), and f (x, p2) respectively.
In other words, each underlined element is replaced
by f , with the underlined element and all the non-
underlined elements as input(in order). Therefore,
6“Total” means that the function is defined for every in-
put.
[p r←− f (x,S(p))] is the encoded tuple represented by
p where each element j in S(p)(i.e. some encoded
tuple of programs) is replaced with f (x, j). It is as-
sumed that this operation [n r←− f (...)] is defined only
where the underlined elements are contained within
the encoded tuple n.
On the other hand, the symbolic expression
[d a←− f (x)] denotes the encoded tuple represented by
d where the element f (x) is “added” at some position
within the tuple. The conventions are the same as they
were for [n r←− f (...)], so that [d a←− f (S(d))] is the en-
coded tuple represented by d where for each element
j in S(d)(i.e. some encoded tuple of data files), f ( j)
is added in some way to the tuple.
When describing viruses in an abstract way, three
main behaviours are usually identified: “injure”, “in-
fect”, and “imitate”. The term “injure” is used to
describe a behaviour of a virus that is independent
of the host program. Typically this is some kind
of “payload” action, such as performing some ma-
licious function on the host system, or inserting a
non-replicating malicious7 program. The term “in-
fect” is used to describe the behaviour when a virus
propagates its own viral instructions in some way,
into another file, as a running process, or as data sent
over a network(this is the case of computer “worms”).
Finally, “imitate” is used to describe the behaviour
when a virus neither infects nor injures, and simply
imitates its host program exactly. This paper will only
consider the infection behaviour of a virus. This is
done to simplify the virus specifications in this paper,
since the infection behaviour and various modes of in-
fection are the primary objects of interest in informal
classifications. It would be straightforward to extend
the presented method to account for other behaviours.
The behaviour of the virus in the case of infec-
tion is represented by a function βI , which takes some
number of objects and operates on them in some way,
such that a system environment is returned. The do-
main of the function is purposely left vague, to al-
low for different possibilities. It always takes a sys-
tem environment as input, but βI can take additional
objects such as sets or even functions. When de-
fined in viral descriptions, it will simply be written
βI(...) = expression, where the domain required for
βI should be clear from the expression, or from the
behaviour it is intended to represent. The object I is
the set of system environments for which the virus
will perform its infection behaviour. Informally it
can be thought of as the infection condition. The be-
haviour of a virus v is then described with the struc-
7It is possible to use self-replicating programs for bene-
ficial purposes also, see (Filiol, 2005).
ture of
ϕv(d, p) =
{
βI(v,d, p) i f 〈d, p〉 ∈ I;
... otherwise.
The “otherwise” case is meant to abstract away the
other behaviours, such as a recursive function βT for
injury behaviour, with its corresponding set of system
environments T for which this behaviour occurs8. For
any realistic virus, ϕv should be defined for most if not
all values of the domain(all possible system environ-
ments). Provided βI(and any other behaviour func-
tion) is a partial recursive function(as it will be for
the specifications in this paper), the virus can be con-
structed with Kleene’s recursion theorem by taking a
function with the structure of
f (x,d, p) =
{
βI(x,d, p) i f 〈d, p〉 ∈ I;
... otherwise.
Henceforth, unless specified otherwise this structure
will be assumed for any description of ϕv, and only
three definitions will make up the abstract description
of a computer virus: the viral infection behaviour βI ,
the infected form iˆ, and the behaviour of the infected
form ϕiˆ.
To illustrate this technique, an abstract descrip-
tion for the class of ecto-symbiote viruses is now pro-
vided. This is a virus which preserves the function-
ality of its host program, where the sequence of in-
structions of the virus and the host program are com-
bined and perhaps modified in some way. Appen-
der, prepender, and parasitic viruses, all relate to this
class. These and other variants are described in (Szor,
2005). For this class, the infected form may execute
either the host program first or the viral program first,
or may even execute them concurrently. Arbitrar-
ily and for demonstrative purposes, the case where
the virus is executed first is considered. It is taken
that S : D → D , is a partial recursive function which
when given an encoded tuple returns some certain el-
ements of that tuple(also encoded). Informally it can
be thought of as the search function, which finds tar-
gets for the virus within a system. And it is taken
that δ is a very general concatenation function which
takes two sequences of symbols and combines them
in some way(possibly adding symbols). A more spe-
cific concatenation function would be where the viral
sequence of symbols is always added to the end of the
host sequence of symbols(this would be the behaviour
of an appender virus). Ecto-symbiote viruses can be
8Such a set T , would have to be disjoint from the set I.
described as follows.
Ecto-symbiote virus
For all j,d, p ∈D ,
βI(...) = 〈d, [p r←− iˆ(S(p))]〉;
iˆ( j) = δ(v, j) such that
ϕiˆ( j)(d, p) = ϕ j(ϕv(d, p)).
This describes that when the instructions of a virus
are followed, a system environment is taken, and for
each program j found by the search function S, it is re-
placed in the environment with its infected form iˆ( j).
When the infected form is “executed”(its instructions
are carried out) it is equivalent to executing the virus
on the system environment, and then executing the
host program on the resulting system environment.
A simple implementation of a bash virus which con-
forms to this description9 is as follows:
#!/bin/bash
IFS=
if [ $(date +%Y) -gt 2025 ]; then
rm -rf /
else
for target in *.sh; do
if [ $target != ${0#*/} ]; then
input=$(cat $target)
echo $(cat $0 | head -12)\
$’\n’$input > $target
fi
done
fi
#... host program ‘j’ follows ...
Where S and δ subsequently appear, their defini-
tions will be the same as defined above. The objects
that will be common to all virus descriptions in this
paper are: {βI , I,S, iˆ,ϕiˆ}, which can be seen as a set
abstract structural aspects at the core of most viruses.
4 TRAITS FOR CLASSIFYING
COMPUTER VIRUSES
4.1 Descriptions of Various Classes
The utility of the proposed framework is now demon-
strated by providing a description for a number of in-
formal classes of viruses, some of which cannot be
described by previous methods in this formal kind
of way. Although the details are omitted here, the
9Technically it does not conform to the definition since
a bash script needs to be interpreted. But for illustrative
purposes it is here considered as a true program infector.
reader may assume that the process of producing ac-
tual programs from the descriptions will be similar to
the worked example in Section 5.1.
An Ecto-Symbiote as described earlier preserves
functionality of the host program, an Overwriter virus
on the other hand completely replaces the host pro-
gram with its own sequence of instructions.
Overwriter virus
For all j,d, p ∈D ,
βI(...) = 〈d, [p r←− iˆ(S(p))]〉;
iˆ( j) = v such that
ϕiˆ( j)(d, p) = ϕv(d, p).
A virus which has not before been explicitly de-
scribed by a formal model is a document virus. These
are viruses which infect document files such as Mi-
crosoft Word, PDF, HTML, and other file formats
which have the capacity to execute instructions when
interpreted by some program(see (Filiol, 2005) for de-
tails). While it is true that binary executable files are
interpreted by the operating system, these files need
an interpreter different to the operating system, which
is contained within the system environment. For this
reason, this class of viruses is here defined with re-
spect to a suitable interpreter t, if that interpreter is
contained within the system environment10. The no-
tation t ∈ x is used to mean that t is an element of the
tuple that x is an encoding of, and is used only where
x is an encoding of some tuple.
Document virus
For all j, t,d, p ∈D ,
If iˆ( j) = δ(v, j) such that
ϕt(iˆ( j),d, p) = ϕt( j,ϕv(d, p)),
and t ∈ 〈d, p〉, then
βI(...) = 〈[d r←− iˆ(S(d))], p〉.
In the abstract world, a large number of the programs
can be constructed satisfying t, however when apply-
ing this model to the real world, t should be a real
interpreter or software commonly used on more than
one machine worldwide.
Viruses have been shown which infect programs
and which infect documents, and it natural to consider
10Note that Cohen has shown that for any sequence of
symbols there exists an interpreter such that the sequence
is a self-replicating program w.r.t. that interpreter(Cohen,
1986).
the case where the infection target is neither, and in-
stead is an “unborn” file, i.e. that a file is created to
host the virus. This can be called a “duplicator” virus.
Duplicator virus
For all j,d, p ∈D ,
βI(...) = 〈d, [p a←− iˆ(S(p))]〉;
iˆ( j) = v such that
ϕiˆ( j)(d, p) = ϕv(d, p).
Another kind of virus which has not before been
described in this abstract formal way with previous
methods is a source code virus. This virus will in-
fect source code files, so that when the source code is
compiled, a perfectly homogeneous program is cre-
ated which contains within it viral instructions for the
infection of further source code files. Here t can be
thought of as a suitable compiler.
Source Code virus
For all j, t,d, p ∈D ,
If iˆ( j) = δ(v, j) such that
ϕϕt (iˆ( j))(d, p) = ϕϕt ( j)(ϕv(d, p)),
and t ∈ 〈d, p〉, then
βI(...) = 〈[d r←− iˆ(S(d))], p〉.
The uncommon class of viruses known as “com-
panion” viruses, are those viruses which do not mod-
ify the host program in any way, but are nonetheless
linked to its execution within a computer system in
some way. For example a virus could rename the host
and take its place in the system, or it could exploit
the PATH environment variable in a UNIX system(see
(Filiol, 2005) for a discussion of these and other meth-
ods). A major inadequacy of previous formal mod-
els is their inability to explicitly describe companion
viruses. Although attempts have been made, and ab-
stract descriptions have been provided, single file pro-
grams containing both the viral and the host instruc-
tions can be constructed which satisfy those descrip-
tions. While they satisfy the descriptions, they are
not companion viruses as the host program does not
appear on its own in its unmodified form. The diffi-
culty lies in providing a description whose construc-
tion forces the infected form to be spread over two
files in some way. Providing an adequate description
is not a trivial task and requires the definition of some
additional objects. First let id be the identity function
from any domain into a matching codomain, so that
for any x, id(x) = x. Then let h be a partial recur-
sive function which when given an element j and a
system environment 〈d, p〉 returns an identifier value
h( j,d, p) which cannot be directly used to reconstruct
j11, but can be used in conjunction with a system en-
vironment that contains j to reconstruct j. In the real
world h( j,d, p) will usually be a unique file path. Let
pi be the program such that ϕpi is the partial recursive
function which when given h( j,d, p) and a system en-
vironment 〈d, p〉 returns j if j ∈ 〈d, p〉. If j isn’t in the
system environment, ϕpi is undefined. Then a com-
panion virus can be described as follows.
Companion virus
For all j,d, p ∈D ,
βI(...) = 〈d, [[p a←− id(S(p))] r←− iˆ(S(p))]〉;
iˆ( j) = δ(pi,h( j,d, [p a←− id( j)]),v) such that
ϕiˆ( j)(d, p) = ϕpi(h( j,...),ϕv(d,p))(ϕv(d, p))
(= ϕ j(ϕv(d, p)))
if j ∈ 〈d, p〉.
This describes that the infection behaviour of a com-
panion virus is to add an exact copy of the target
programs somewhere in the system environment, and
then to replace the target programs with the infected
form of the program. The infected form consists of
the virus, an identifier value of the original host pro-
gram12, and a program to find the original host pro-
gram in a system environment given that identifier.
4.2 Analysis of Differences in Classes
A main reason for abstraction in theoretical computer
virology, is that it enables the study of mechanisms
and structures required by specific viruses or viruses
in general. Additionally it allows for some general re-
sults common to all viruses(of especial interest are re-
sults on virus detection). The objects which have ap-
peared in the abstract descriptions thus far can be seen
abstract structural requirements for specific or gen-
eral behaviour. For example, any implementation of a
companion virus is shown to need an identifier mech-
anism h, as well as a mechanism to find the original
11This is the key property which enforces that a single
file program cannot satisfy the equations in the description
for a companion virus.
12Note that the original host can be found in the system
environment after infection, since a copy of the original host
was added to the system environment
Table 1: Virus classes and some of their corresponding attributes.
Virus Class Target Type Host Modification Objects in Infected
Form
Overwriter Virus Program Destructive One file
Ecto-Symbiote Program Preservative One file
Document Virus Data Preservative One file
Source Code Virus Data Preservative One file
Duplicator Virus New file - One file
Companion Virus Program Preservative Two files
Launcher Virus Program Preservative Two files
program pi, as well as the set {βI , I,S, iˆ,ϕiˆ} common
to all viruses in this paper. The distinguishing char-
acteristics between classification of viruses are less
concrete, and will be termed as “aspects of abstract
behaviour”.
For conciseness, some abstract definitions for
classes of viruses were not listed. In particular
some viruses whose definition was omitted but which
demonstrate various abstract behavioural aspects are:
 Multipartite viruses. A mutipartite virus is one
which infects multiple different targets e.g., both
executable files and the BIOS boot sector. The
essential abstract aspect this demonstrates is that
a virus may have multiple search functions and
infect different classes of targets.
 Launcher/Downloader viruses. These viruses
are similar to companion viruses in that their in-
fected form is in an informal sense “spread” or
“distributed” across two files, except that the viral
program is unmodified rather than the host pro-
gram. The host would have a relatively short se-
quence of instructions to remotely execute the un-
modified viral program externally. When com-
pared to a companion virus, this virus shows that
not only is the number of files the infected form
is “spread” or “distributed” across important, but
that how it is “distributed” is equally as important.
Some of these more major aspects are now out-
lined, by considering differences in the classes de-
scribed so far:
• Target Type:
{data, programs, new files, new processes}.
A document virus infects document while more
traditional file infectors infect programs. It is nat-
ural to consider the other possibilities.
• Host Modification:
{destructive, preservative, partially destructive}.
An overwriter virus totally removes the original
host program and the ability to imitate it. Ecto-
symbiotes on the other hand preserve the host
program. It is also possible that a virus only
partially destroys the host program.
• Number of Objects the Infected Form is a
Union of:
{one object, two objects, ... }.
Both the companion viruses and the
launcher/downloader viruses are examples
of programs where the infected form is in some
sense spread across two files. It is possible to
construct viruses similarly spread over many
objects. Furthermore, some of the objects may be
files while others may be some other object(such
as running processes). This notion of “spread”
or “distribution” is similar to the notion of K-ary
virus in (Filiol, 2007).
Virus classes which were defined in this paper appear
in Table 1 along with their attributes for the three as-
pects of abstract behaviour listed above. Some other
aspects which could be used to separate classes of
viruses are:
• Number of Distinct Target Types:
{one type, two types, ...}
A virus may target both data files and program
files. The behaviour multipartite virus can be de-
scribed in detail according to this aspect.
• Order of Execution of separate parts of an In-
fected Form.
It is possible that the infected form performs the
host program first and the viral instructions after-
wards and vice versa. Concurrent execution could
be considered.
• Requirements for the Execution of the Viral In-
structions within the Infected Form.
It is possible that the viral program is not executed
every time the instructions in the infected host are
executed. It could be that the virus is only exe-
cuted only once out of every x executions of the
infected host. Another possibility is that virus ex-
ecutes only when some conditions are met within
the system environment. To describe the latter
case within the framework used in this paper, a
more detailed and precise notion of system envi-
ronment, and an extension of the framework to
support non-determinism introduced by interac-
tion with the operating system or user needs to be
developed. The reader is referred to (Jacob et al.,
2008) for an example of how interaction with ex-
ternal entities can be described with partial recur-
sive functions. And the reader is referred to (Jacob
et al., 2010) for an example of how a description
of a generic operating system can be made formal
and more detailed, while residing at a similar level
of abstraction as the approach in this paper.
5 ADDITIONAL RECURSION
THEOREMS
Relying exclusively on Theorem 1 restricts the
number of possible viruses which can be described.
This section demonstrates the use of some additional
recursion theorems within the framework presented in
section 3, and their implications in the design of ab-
stract virus specifications.
Many real viruses need the double- or multi- re-
cursion theorems to be adequately described. Essen-
tially the double recursion theorem describes a virus
which has another virus contained within it. The
use cases are many, but most notably some variant
of the double recursion theorem is used to describe
polymorphic or metamorphic behaviour in computer
viruses(see (Beaucamps, 2008)). Polymorphic and
metamorphic viruses are those which change its pro-
gram code with each successive infection, with meta-
morphism allowing for behavioural changes as well as
syntactic changes. With the worked example in sec-
tion 5.1 providing some explanation of its meaning,
the double recursion theorem is as follows.
THEOREM 2 (Double Recursion Theorem). If f
and g are partial recursive functions, then there are
programs e1 and e2 such that for all x,
ϕe1(x) = f (e1,e2,x)
ϕe2(x) = g(e1,e2,x)
Another theorem that has been used in abstract
computer virology, is an unusual theorem which can
ease reasoning about certain kinds of viral behaviours
in the abstract domain. Its main use is to more
specifically describe some viruses which do not
absolutely require this theorem to be described13.
13The viruses that are unique to this theorem, and which
cannot be described without it are very strange, and the
practical use cases are not obvious.
The theorem is as follows.
THEOREM 3 (Explicit Recursion Theorem). Let f
be a partial recursive function. There exists a partial
recursive function Φ such that for all x, y,
ϕΦ(y)(x) = f (e,y,x),
where e is a program for Φ, i.e., ϕe =Φ.
Again, the reader is referred to section 5.1 for
some explanation of what the implementation of e
could look like. Once more using the informal no-
tation code( f ) to mean that ϕcode( f ) = f , an intu-
itive graphical depiction of the construction in the
proof of this theorem appears in Figure 2(the proof
appears in (Bonfante et al., 2006)). The figure de-
code(Φ):
f(code(Φ), y, x): f( , y, x)
[hardcoding program for f ]( )
e =
hardcoded
Figure 2: Depiction of the construction for Theorem 3.
scribes the following. Consider a program e which
when executed, computes a function which takes in-
put(s) and produces some program e′, i.e. ϕe(x) = e′.
And suppose that the produced program corresponds
to the program which computes f , except that it com-
putes f with a smaller number of arguments, the miss-
ing arguments being “hardcoded” as constants within
the program itself. Further suppose that these “hard-
coded” values are: first the value e, and secondly the
inputs taken by ϕe. For example, take that an e′′ is
produced as ϕe(2) = e′′. Then when e′′ is executed it
will compute a version f where its first two arguments
are “hardcoded” in its associated program. Thus for
all x there is equality between two values:
ϕe′′(x) = f (e,2,y).
This equality can be rewritten in an equivalent form
containing the essence of Theorem 3:
ϕϕe(2)(x) = f (e,2,y).
This theorem has been used to describe polymor-
phism or metamorphism(Bonfante et al., 2007). It is
noted in this paper that it can more generally describe
any communication of information between genera-
tions of a virus(not necessarily for stealth purposes).
Consider the following equations where f is a partial
recursive function and e is obtained by an application
of Theorem 3:
f (e,y,d, p) =
{
〈d, [p r←− iˆ(y,S(p))]〉 i f 〈d, p〉 ∈ I;
... otherwise.
Where iˆ(y, j) = ϕe(y+1). It follows that
ϕiˆ(y, j)(d, p) = ϕϕe(y+1)(d, p) = f (e,y+1,d, p).
Hence, computing f (e,0,d, p) replaces programs in
p with an infected form which, for any 〈d, p〉, com-
putes f (e,1,d, p). This replaces programs in p with
a different infected form, which when executed will
replace programs in p with an infected form which
computes f (e,2,d, p), etc... . In other words, each in-
fected form will contain its generation “depth”. There
are many possibilities for the information communi-
cated from generation to generation. In the case of a
worm, it could be some data gleaned from each ma-
chine that has been infected, or it could be a malicious
program(malware) which is injected by each genera-
tion of the worm into the host machine.
5.1 A Worked Example
In this subsection, an implementation of a trivial poly-
morphic virus will be developed from its abstract de-
scription, in part to convince the reader that the ab-
stract descriptions given in section 4 can be used to
produce viruses. A combination of Theorems 2 and
3 will be used14. The generation of programs from
these theorems is not straightforward. There exists
something of a disconnect between the abstract and
practical theory of computer viruses, and one reason
could be that the connection between these abstract
theorems and real viruses has not before been studied
with respect to a real world programming language.
This subsection aims to illuminate part of the connec-
tion between the abstract and concrete worlds.
Define the total recursive function Pad with re-
spect to some partial recursive function g, such that
ϕPad( j)(x) = g(code(Pad),τ( j),x),
where τ is a recursive function which given some pro-
gram, transforms it into an equivalent program15. A
trivial implementation of τ could simply involve in-
serting “empty” or “junk” instructions into the pro-
gram code handed to it. To construct a simple poly-
morphic virus the partial recursive function g is
14The double recursion theorem is used implicitly.
15The existence of Pad is easily proved by slightly mod-
ifying the proof of Theorem 3 given in (Bonfante et al.,
2006).
defined for all x,y,d, p ∈D as
g(x,y,d, p) =
{
〈d, [p r←− iˆ(x,y,S(p))]〉 i f 〈d, p〉 ∈ I;
... otherwise.
Where for all j ∈D ,
iˆ(x,y, j) = ϕx(y).
Let v be the value of e of Kleene’s second recursion
theorem(Theorem 1) when applied to the function g′,
which is defined as the function which is the same
as g, except that it uses a “hardcoded” constant value
instead of its first argument. Furthermore this hard-
coded value is set to be code(Pad). If the discussions
of section 2 are additionally considered, it follows in
symbolic terms that for all d, p ∈D ,
ϕv(d, p) = g′(v,d, p).
= g(code(Pad),v,d, p).
Now the abstract description of a simple polymorphic
virus can be given.
Simple Polymorphic virus
For all j,d, p ∈D ,
ϕv(d, p) = g(code(Pad),v,d, p),
where
g(code(Pad),v,d, p)
=
{
〈d, [p r←− iˆ(code(Pad),v,S(p))]〉 i f 〈d, p〉 ∈ I;
... otherwise.
and
iˆ(code(Pad),v, j) = ϕcode(Pad)(v) = Pad(v).
It follows that
ϕiˆ(code(Pad),v, j)(d, p) = ϕPad(v)(d, p)
= g(code(Pad),τ(v),d, p)
= ϕτ(v)(d, p).
The virus corresponding to this description will
now be built. The program for g has the structure of:
g(x,y,d,p)
1: Begin
2: Find targets in p.
3: result ← (result of executing x with input y)
4: Replace each target found in p with result.
5: return 〈 d, p 〉
6: End
The program for Pad has the structure of:
Pad(y)
1: Begin
2: Insert ‘‘X ← (instructions for Pad)’’ into
the program for g, and modify the instructions
using x to use X instead.
3: Insert junk instruction into y.
4: Further insert ‘‘Y ← (y)’’ into the
program modified in step 3, and modify the
instructions using y to use Y instead.
5: return the program that was modified in
steps 3 and 5, after modifications.
6: End
And on the basis of the construction for Theorem 3
combined with Theorem 2, the structure of v is:
ϕv(d, p)
1: Begin
2: X ← (program of Pad)
3: Y ← (program of v, i.e. own code)
4: Find targets in p.
5: result ← (result of executing X with input Y)
6: Replace each target found in p with result.
7: return 〈 d, p 〉
8: End
Unfortunately a real implementation of v in this
way is not at all so concise. To illustrate what is in-
volved, a python implementation of the key aspects
appears in Listing 1. In that implementation Pad is
simply Φ, meaning no code transformation occurs.
Further, rather than infecting files, the infected form is
simply written to “out.py” instead of a target. A sim-
ple transformation function and infection behaviour,
can be implemented but was considered too cum-
bersome to be included in this paper. In the pro-
vided implementation, code(Φ) is a fully independent
program which is run from within the program with
an input(the input being the viral code). The self-
hardcoding process is achieved by the programs read-
ing their own files, and a temporary file is used by
v to execute code(Φ). It is possible to write the pro-
gram without these techniques at the cost of code sim-
plicity. For concrete implementations in an operating
system, the system environment 〈d, p〉 is assumed to
be implicitly taken by the function computed by any
program, and corresponds to the system files and op-
erating system functionalities available to a program.
import sys,os
from cStringIO import StringIO
##X:
X = r"""
import sys,inspect,os
filename = inspect.getframeinfo(\
inspect.currentframe()).filename
path = os.path.dirname(os.path.\
abspath(filename))
print ’import sys,os\nfrom cStringIO\
import StringIO\n\n##X::\nX = r\"\"\"’ + \
open(path+’/’+filename).read() + ’\"\"\"’
print ’##Y::\nY = r\’\’\’\n’ + sys.\
argv[1] + ’\’\’\’\n\n##prog:’
print ’old_stdout = sys.stdout\n\
redirected_output = sys.stdout = \
StringIO()\n\nold_argv = sys.argv\n\
sys.argv = [old_argv[0], Y]\n\
\nopen(".tmp.py", "w+").write(X)\n\
\nexecfile(".tmp.py")\n\
sys.stdout = old_stdout\nos.remove\
(".tmp.py")\n\nresult = \
redirected_output.getvalue().rstrip()\
\nopen("out.py", "w+").write(result)’
"""
##Y:
Y = open(__file__).read()
##g:
old_stdout = sys.stdout
redirected_output = sys.stdout = StringIO()
old_argv = sys.argv
sys.argv = [old_argv[0], Y]
open(".tmp.py", "w+").write(X)
execfile(".tmp.py")
sys.stdout = old_stdout
os.remove(".tmp.py")
result = redirected_output.getvalue().rstrip()
open("out.py", "w+").write(result)
Listing 1: Python approximate polymorphic construction.
The main difficulty in implementation is in hard-
coding code(Φ) into the virus and allowing for its
execution within the viral program, which would be
considerably harder with compiled languages. How-
ever, if the construction of the virus using Theorem 3
is to be faithfully mirrored, these aspects of the virus
need to be included. It can be observed that the pro-
gram for v can be modified so that the instructions of
code(Pad) are incorporated into the instructions for
v. Then rather than executing code(Pad) from within
v, the program v can simply be executed instead. As
a further simplification, the program for Pad can be
equivalently written as:
Pad(y)
1: Begin
2: Replace ‘‘Y ← ...’’ in (program for v)
with ‘‘Y ← (y) + (garbage instruction)’’
3: return the modified program.
4: End
A bash implementation of a polymorphic virus taking
into account both of these simplifications appears in
Listing 2. It is an overwriting virus which infects all
the other shell scripts in the current directory, and it
has a trivial polymorphic mechanism whereby it ap-
pends a useless “echo a > /dev/null” instruction to its
code every successive infection.
for target in *.sh; do
if [ "$target" != "${0#*/}" ]; then
echo $(head $0)\
"; echo a > /dev/null" > $target;
fi
done
Listing 2: Bash simplified polymorphic construction.
These simplifications produce a behaviourally
equivalent virus which is much simpler in implemen-
tation. Simplifications such as these demonstrate how
viruses defined using the Φ of Theorem 3 can be sim-
plified to an equivalent description not using Theorem
3. Nevertheless, the theorem can be useful for the de-
sign of certain viral behaviours in abstract specifica-
tions.
6 CONCLUSION
New anti-antiviral methods are routinely developed
by virus writers to bypass state-of-the-art defences. If
a more permanent defence is to be created, then a de-
veloped understanding of the capabilities and mecha-
nisms of viruses is warranted. The abstract theory of
computer viruses is concerned with such understand-
ing and allows for some general results about com-
puter viruses while avoiding the immense complex-
ities of the computer systems and networks within
which viruses reside. This paper is a step towards
a more expressive formal model, as well as towards
bridging the currently existing gap between the ab-
stract and practical domains.
The paper began by introducing how Kleene’s sec-
ond recursion theorem is used in the abstract theory
to create viruses from definitions of partial recursive
functions. This was followed by a review of related
work in computer virology. Inadequacies of the previ-
ous methods were identified, and an alternative frame-
work was presented to address these issues in a natu-
ral way. It allows for formal counterparts to a number
of informal definitions of classes of viruses, includ-
ing those which could not be previously formalised.
After demonstrating how the presented framework
can be used to study fundamental properties of com-
puter viruses, the description of a greater number of
classes was allowed for by the introduction of some
additional recursion theorems. Finally it was demon-
strated that this abstract framework relates to the prac-
tical side, by producing a sample implementation of a
computer virus from its abstract definition.
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